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130 I N C O R P O R E A L
is independent of the other and cannot therefore be said to enter into a 
relation of transcendence.
Connectives
Nietzsche
Spinoza
Virtual/Virtuality
INCORPOREAL
Tamsin Lorraine
In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze characterises the distinction made by the 
Stoics between mixtures of bodies or states of affairs and incorporeal 
entities that ‘frolic’ on the surface of occurrences (D 1990: 5). According 
to Deleuze, this distinction refers to two planes of being, one of which 
concerns the tensions, physical qualities, actions and passions of bodies; 
and the other of which concerns ‘incorporeal’ entities or events that do not 
exist, but rather ‘subsist or inhere’ in states of affairs. Although incorpo-
real entities can never be actually present, they are the effect of mixtures 
of bodies and can enter into quasi- causal relations with other incorporeals.
The clearest example of the incorporeal is an event of sense. A proposi-
tion like ‘The sun is shining’ expresses a sense that ‘inheres’ in the propo-
sition, but is never reducible to the state of affairs of either one specifi c or 
even an endless series of specifi c instances of a shining sun (D 1990: cf. 
19). Deleuze claims that while states of affairs have the temporality of the 
living present, the incorporeal events of sense are infi nitives (to shine, to 
be the sun) that constitute pure becomings with the temporality of aion – a 
form of time independent of matter that always eludes the present. Thus, 
no matter how many times the state of affairs of a shining sun is actualised, 
the sense of ‘The sun is shining’ is not exhausted. It is this ‘frontier of 
sense’ between what words express and the attributes of bodies that allows 
language to be distinguished from physical bodies. If the actions and pas-
sions of bodies make sense, it is because that sense is not itself either an 
action or a passion, but is rather an incorporeal effect of a state of affairs 
that enters into relations of quasi- causality with other incorporeal events 
of sense. The virtual relations of the events of sense constitute the condi-
tion of any given speech- act. Deleuze refers to the work of Lewis Carroll 
as a revealing example of how these quasi- causal relations can form a ‘non-
sense’ that subsists in ‘common sense’ language.
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In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari characterise a social fi eld 
in terms of a ‘machinic assemblage’ and a ‘collective assemblage of enuncia-
tion’ (D&G 1987: 88). In addition to bodies and the actions and passions 
affecting those bodies (the ‘machinic assemblage’, for example, the body of 
the accused or the body of the prison), there is a set of incorporeal transfor-
mations current in a given society that are attributed to the bodies of that 
society (for example, the transformation of the accused into a convict by the 
judge’s sentence) (D&G 1987: cf. 81). We can view the incorporeal effects of 
states of affairs in terms of either the ‘order- words’ that designate fi xed rela-
tions between statements and the incorporeal transformations they express, 
or the deterritorialising play of Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland (1865). In The 
Logic of Sense, Deleuze describes the actor or Stoic sage as someone able to 
evoke an instant with a taut intensity expressive of an unlimited future and 
past, and thereby embody the incorporeal effects of a state of affairs rather 
than merely its spatio- temporal actualisation (D 1990: 147). Such actors 
do more than merely portray a character’s hopes or regrets; they attempt 
to ‘represent’ a pure instant at the point at which it divides into future and 
past, thus embodying in their performance an intimation of virtual relations 
beyond those actualised in the situation portrayed. If one wills to be just in 
the manner of a Stoic sage, one wills not the repetition of past acts of justice, 
but a justice that has always been and has yet to be – the incorporeal effect of 
justice that is never made fully manifest in any concrete situation. When the 
incorporeal effects of sense are reduced to order- words, we ignore the pure 
becomings of sense and territorialise the infi nite variability of meaning into 
stale repetitions of the past. When we allow the variables of corporeal bodies 
and events of sense to be placed into constant variation, even order- words 
become a passage to the limit. The movement of new connections among 
these variables pushes language to its limits and bodies to a metamorphic 
becoming- other (D&G 1987: 108).
Connective
Becoming
INDIVIDUATION
Constantin V. Boundas
Deleuze’s concept of ‘individuation’ is a genetic account of individu-
als. The concept emerges from a critique of hylomorphism that exposes 
the error in thinking of an individual as the end point of a progressive 
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